Gibbons v. Ogden
John Marshall

**OVERVIEW**
In 1798 the New York State legislature granted Robert Fulton a monopoly on the operation of steamboats in New York waters. In 1811 Fulton’s company gave Aaron Ogden a license to run a ferry service between New York and New Jersey. When Thomas Gibbons tried to start a rival service, Ogden sued, claiming his rights were being violated. A New York State court upheld Ogden’s claim. Gibbons appealed the ruling to the United States Supreme Court. Selections from Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in the 1824 *Gibbons v. Ogden* case follow, showing his broad interpretation of the commerce clause of the Constitution.

**GUIDED READING**
As you read, consider the following questions:
- Why does Marshall define “commerce”?
- What reasons does Marshall give for upholding federal over state law?

The appellant [THOMAS GIBBON] contends that this decree is erroneous because the laws which purport to give the exclusive privilege it sustains are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States. . . .

This instrument [the Constitution] contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the Constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" for the purpose. . . .

What do gentlemen mean by a strict construction? If they contend only against that enlarged construction which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the Constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction, which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded. As men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the
people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. . . .

The words are: "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our Constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. . . .

Commerce, undoubtedlly, is traffic, but it is something more—it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals in the actual employment of buying and selling or of barter. If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they shall be navigated by American seamen.

Yet this power has been exercised from the commencement of the government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation. All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word "commerce" to comprehend navigation. . . .

The word used in the Constitution, then, comprehends, and has been always understood to comprehend, navigation within its meaning; and a power to regulate navigation is as expressly granted as if that term had been added to the word "commerce." To what commerce does this power extend? The Constitution informs us to commerce "with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." It has, we believe, been universally admitted that these words comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and any other to which this power does not extend. . . .

The subject to which the power is next applied is to commerce "among the several states." The word "among" means intermingled with. . . . Comprehensive as the word "among" is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more states than one. . . .

This principle is, if possible, still more clear, when applied to commerce "among the several states." They either join each other, in which case they are separated by a mathematical line, or they are remote from each other, in which case other states lie between them. What is commerce "among" them, and how is it to be conducted? Can a trading expedition between two adjoining states commence and terminate outside of each? And if the trading intercourse be between two states remote from each other, must it not commence in one,
terminate in the other, and probably pass through a third? Commerce among
the states must, of necessity, be commerce with the states. . . .

The power of Congress, then, whatever it may be, must be exercised within
the territorial jurisdiction of the several states. The sense of the nation on this
subject is unequivocally manifested by the provisions made in the laws for
transporting goods by land between Baltimore and Providence, between New

We are now arrived at the inquiry—What is this power? It is the power to
regulate, that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.
This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are
prescribed in the Constitution. . . . The sovereignty of Congress, though
limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states is vested in
Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its
constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in
the Constitution of the United States.

The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people,
and the influence which their constituents possess at elections are, in this as in
many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints
on which they have relied to secure them from its abuse. They are the
restraints on which the people must often rely solely in all representative
governments. The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation within
the limits of every state in the Union so far as that navigation may be, in any
manner, connected with "commerce with foreign nations, or among the
several States, or with the Indian tribes." It may, of consequence, pass the
jurisdiction line of New York, and act upon the very waters to which the
prohibition now under consideration applies.

But it has been urged with great earnestness that, although the power of
Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
states be coextensive with the subject itself, and have no other limits than are
prescribed in the Constitution, yet the states may severally exercise the same
power within their respective jurisdictions. . . .

. . . The sole question is—Can a state regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the states while Congress is regulating it? . . .

It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant that, as the word
"to regulate" implies in its nature full power over the thing to be regulated, it
excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same
operation on the same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire result,
applying to those parts which remain as they were, as well as to those which
are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and
deranged by changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched as
that on which it has operated. There is great force in this argument, and the
court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.
Since, however, in exercising the power of regulating their own purely internal affairs, whether of trading or police, the states may sometimes enact laws, the validity of which depends on their interfering with, and being contrary to, an act of Congress passed in pursuance of the Constitution, the court will enter upon the inquiry, whether the laws of New York, as expounded by the highest tribunal of that state, have, in their application to this case, come into collision with an act of Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which that act entitles him. Should this collision exist, it will be immaterial whether those laws were passed in virtue of a concurrent power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states," or in virtue of a power to regulate their domestic trade and police.

In one case and the other the acts of New York must yield to the law of Congress; and the decision sustaining the privilege they confer against a right given by a law of the Union must be erroneous. This opinion has been frequently expressed in this court, and is founded as well on the nature of the government as on the words of the Constitution. In argument, however, it has been contended that, if a law passed by a state in the exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty comes into conflict with a law passed by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution, they affect the subject and each other like equal opposing powers.

But the framers of our Constitution foresaw this state of things and provided for it by declaring the supremacy not only of itself but of the laws made in pursuance of it. The nullity of any act inconsistent with the Constitution is produced by the declaration that the Constitution is supreme law. The appropriate application of that part of the clause which confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties is to such acts of the state legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but though enacted in the execution of acknowledged state powers, interfere with, or are contrary to, the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution or some treaty made under the authority of the United States. In every such case, the act of Congress or the treaty is supreme; and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it. . . .

Decree . . . This court is of opinion that . . . so much of the several laws of the state of New York as prohibits vessels, licensed according to the laws of the United States, from navigating the waters of the state of New York, by means of fire or steam, is repugnant to the said Constitution and void.